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Put yourself in the CIOs seat of
a fund of hedge funds for a moment. Imagine
describing to investors your risk-management
process for existing and prospective investments.
Our risk-management process relies
on the risk-adjusted returns listed on the
major investors databases to which
we subscribe. Key amongst these are the
Sharpe ratios that we use to assess performance.
In addition, all the funds in which we invest
have an in-house risk manager and provide
risk information via third-party independent
providers. As we are invested in all the
major strategies, we are comfortable with
the diversification in our returns.
Sound familiar? Relatively standard pieces
such as the one mentioned above have become
familiar AI jargon.
If diversification is the name of the game,
the CIO above would need to offer plenty
of explanations after the months of April
and May. According to the HFR database,
all major strategies were down in April.
Based on preliminary estimates, May will
broadly continue the previous months
pattern. Such tight correlation in performance
is striking because there were no single-day
shocks, defaults or other catastrophic events
to blame as, for instance, during the Tequila,
Asian or Russian crises. The answer has
to be found elsewhere.
This article addresses a variety of common
myths on diversification and liquidity,
hot topics for anybody who is looking for
ways to attract the interest of institutional
investors. A sequel article will delve into
the topic of risk management in hedge funds,
another important element in a funds
marketing process.
The oft-used magic word of diversification
has several important meanings to investors.
Lets review some of the most common:
| Diversification
by
|
Achieved
by
|
Benefit/Implication |
|
Fund Strategy/Asset Class |
Spreading the allocation across funds
that operate in different strategies
and/ or asset classes. |
Attempt to preserve capital by limiting
exposure to underperforming asset
at any given point in time. |
|
Fund within a Strategy/Asset Class |
Spreading the allocation to different
funds within a given strategy/asset
class. |
Limit exposure to any individual managers
underperformance or other negative
elements (e.g., fraud). |
|
Risk-return profile |
Spreading the allocation to funds
and strategies that experience peaks
and troughs in performance at different
points in time and as a result of
a variety of market conditions. |
Attempt to limit the correlation of
performance between different elements
of the portfolio. |
Use of past performance figures is the
acid test on which all of the standard definitions
above can rely. These definitions of diversification
are attractive for quantitative asset allocation
and limits, since they are fairly objective
and can be formalised in numbers and codes
to feed computer models.
Liquidity is another element that
is often high on many investors question
list. Unfortunately, as we will soon see,
diversification and liquidity are generally
located in two watertight compartments.
Liquidity is an odd creature, in that only
rough quantitative measures exist to track
it. Most common examples include average
daily or weekly trading volume, average
bid-offer spread or concentrations of largest
block traders as a proportion of total trading
volume. As such, liquidity does not easily
lend itself to quantitative asset allocation,
and most investors address it with crude
limits and guidelines, such as:
no more than x% of total
daily trading volume, or
no more than x% of total allocation
into a given fund, or
no more than x% of total assets
of any fund.
There are several definitions of liquidity
and the semantics can be a challenge. Indeed,
many if not most investors associate it
with their ability to pull their investments
out of a fund. Thus, the following table
attempts to clarify some of the meanings
that are most frequently associated with
liquidity:
| Definition |
Meaning |
Remarks |
|
A) Exit liquidity |
The speed with which one can liquidate
the investment in a fund |
The most common definition for fund
investors. |
|
B) Trading liquidity |
Ability and cost of liquidating a
position |
The most general definition in the
trading world. |
|
C) Funding liquidity |
Ability and cost of financing a trading
inventory |
The classic funding definition. Most
important for strategies such
as Private Equity or Distressed
that have extended holding horizons. |
|
D) Spread liquidity |
The difference in liquidity between
similar comparable securities/strategies |
It is the impact of liquidity on market
risk and the requirement for a liquidity
premium that it causes. Involves the
differential of change in market value
between the most liquid comparable
security/strategy and the security/
strategy that one holds. Most critical
for relativevalue strategies, since
these rely on major complex hedging
assumptions. |
|
E) Strategic or systemic
liquidity |
Sensitivity of AI industrys
aggregate flows to the absolute level
of risk-free yields |
From a macro perspective, it refers
to the decision to allocate to AI
vis-à-vis default risk-free
government securities. |
Amongst these, the first three are fairly
straightforward. The fourth is not, since
it tracks an unwelcome derivative effect
of liquidity that lurks in the dark. This
fairly elusive side, unfortunately, is often
the flipside of the return coin for most
investors. One could define it as follows:
(%RP/%IP), where the numerator refers to
the percentage return over a given
time horizon achieved by security
P, and the denominator indicates the return
achieved by a preset reference index I for
the most liquid comparable security. The
classic instances that come to mind are
the on-the-run versus off-the-run
Treasury Notes in the U.S. government bond
market. The on-the-run securities provide
the benchmark against which all other comparable
securities are priced. Then, the above equation
assumes the value 1 for on-the-run securities,
since numerator and denominator move by
an equal amount. Depending on the current
market trend, it will change by more or
less than 1 for all other securities. This
means risk for investors, who, accordingly,
will require compensation in terms of an
excess return. This is the liquidity
premium.
Off-the-run securities will also feature
wider bid-offer spreads the definition
of trading liquidity risk than their
on-the-run counterparts. Thus, the latter
will be the preferred choice for investors
who wish to execute quickly and inexpensively.
This, in turn, will make their prices move
faster than the others in the presence of
large market fluctuations. Consequently,
on-the-run securities will have a bias towards
outperforming the others during the first
move of bullish trends and will fare marginally
worse at the beginning of bear markets.
Correlation pairs between similar equities
or credit instruments also feature a security
with a risk premium and will display similar
behaviours.
From a strict semantics point of view,
relative-value arbitrages and
the instability of the liquidity premium
would seem contradictory. As a matter of
fact, that liquidity differential is the
very reason for the premium. In practice,
one can view the premium as an option that
the investor has sold: most of the times,
he or she will earn an excess return by
being long the less liquid security and
short the more liquid one to hedge against
directional market risk. By definition,
the liquidity premium should never become
negative, since the liquidity features of
the benchmark security will always have
some extra appeal relative to others. Sometimes,
however, the more liquid security of which
the investor is short will rally more than
his long leg of the arbitrage. This means
that the excess return the liquidity
premium will widen and large
losses will follow.
Several prestigious hedge funds have fallen
prey to the vagaries of the liquidity premium.
Following the default of Russia, the summer
of 1998 witnessed a major rally in the U.S.
Treasury Bond market. Many funds which had
set up arbitrages by holding off-the-run,
higher yielding Treasuries and shorting
on-the-run issues were caught on the wrong
side of the trade. Of course, the massive
amounts of leverage added on top of these
trades resulted in a major explosion of
the losses.
Over the last 18 months, the importance
of liquidity for returns has been the target
of empirical work. In particular, one of
the most advanced pieces of research to
date (Getmansky, Lo & Makarov, 2003)
has studied over 900 funds in the Tremont-TASS
database to investigate serial correlation
and illiquidity in hedge-fund returns. While
preliminary, the results confirm the intuition
that illiquidity is the real source of returns
for the AI industry and their investors.
Lo, Petrov & Wierzbicki (forthcoming)
also show that portfolios with very different
liquidity features can be constructed to
fit standard mean-variance portfolio optimisation.
Increases in negative skewness and kurtosis
in portfolios with higher allocations to
hedge funds and other statistical properties
are also fairly well-known features that
have attracted substantial research work
(see, amongst others, Kat, 2001; 2002).
The aspect that is puzzling about investors
relatively nonchalant attitude toward liquidity
is that, from a macroeconomic point of view,
hedge funds are machines created to probe
the frontiers of theoretical finance in
the real world (Goetzmann, 2004). Accordingly,
they are compensated for their efforts to
test the quantitative and qualitative capacity
of markets to absorb new financial inventions
and strategies. Eventually, liquidity
or lack thereof is the name of the
game. While being paid to test the frontier,
in the form of a liquidity premium, AI managers
can never really quantify the denominator
of this ratio, namely, how much illiquidity
they are taking.
This is the point in which the false promises
of diversification come in. By diversifying
as indicated in the table above, investors
are indeed actively managing their concentration
by manager, strategy and asset class. As
demonstrated by the Getmansky, Lo &
Makarovs study, however, liquidity
is the theme that cuts across virtually
all strategies.
One could view it as the systematic, undiversifiable
risk of the AI industry. Spreading allocations
across a variety of strategies gives the
investor a presumed but illusory
diversification benefit. This way,
investors are displaying a psychological
weakness that is well known in behavioural
finance, the 1/n bias (Benartzi &
Thaler, 1998).
According to this tendency, investors are
prone to increase the number of securities
in which they invest regardless of their
common underlying exposure. Consistent with
the popular adage of not putting too many
eggs into one basket, a broader range of
different strategies provides psychological
comfort. In the same fashion, many investors
fall in the trap of believing that having
several different strategies and a variety
of managers will protect them from liquidity
crunches. In addition, investors who rely
on diversification alone are unwittingly
taking a bet on the correlation of different
asset classes remaining fairly tame.
The fifth definition of liquidity
strategic liquidity risk is even
more elusive for the industry but no less
disquieting. One chilling statistic from
the HFR database summarises it beyond doubt:
over the last 14 years, the AI industry
has experienced net outflows only once.
That was in 1994, the worst bear market
in bonds in six decades but a relatively
short one. Since then, a lot of the capacity
has been built in and around the AI industry
over the last few years. It is legitimate
to wonder how prepared the industry
and the largest funds are for the
possibility of an extended bear market in
bonds.
How can one manage liquidity risk more
consciously? Let me suggest some simple
steps:
1) First of all, an investor must be very
clear on the portfolio objectives in terms
of buying or selling liquidity insurance
and at what cost. Most funds will be structural
liquidity insurance sellers and get paid
accordingly. If you are uncomfortable with
the amount of liquidity insurance that your
funds are selling, youd better get
real on the returns on your return targets,
too.
2) You can then proceed to classify how
your different hedge fund strategies may
behave under different liquidity conditions.
For instance, a credit crunch in the Treasury
market will likely but not always
coincide with a credit crunch in
equity markets. Under these circumstances,
your current diversification policy will
indeed help you.
3) Consistent with basic Risk Management,
your AI managers should provide sufficient
evidence of ongoing portfolio stress-testing
to assess portfolio performance under a
variety of liquidity conditions. Correlations
can and do become unreasonable
and impossible every once in
a while.
4) Last but not least, there is a small
segment of hedge funds that are classified
as Long-Volatility or even Long-Gamma
funds that are taking the other side
of the liquidity trade. Under normal or
benign liquidity conditions, these niche
players will expect to incur a higher percentage
of small losses than other strategies. This
is natural, since they are essentially investing
in liquidity insurance, an event with a
relatively infrequent positive payoff. In
return, however, they will tend to outperform
in those 10%20% of the instances of
turmoil in which liquidity conditions and
correlations tend to become most stretched.
A proportional allocation to these strategies
can help smooth your return profile in these
particular situations. As their bets experience
windfall profits only occasionally, tight
position-sizing is key to their performance.
5) With respect to strategic liquidity
risk investors should assess carefully
a funds breakeven point and revenue
sensitivity. It does not take a genius to
figure out the link between increased operational
risk and the sudden cut-backs and layoffs
that would result from an industry downturn.
Other psychological biases loom large over
investors AI allocation process. My
forthcoming book The Dark Side of Risk Management
(Prentice-Hall, July 2004) explains some
of their practical consequences. Let me
leave you with some questions that will
be revisited in detail in the sequel to
this article in the next issue:
1) What do people mean by Risk Management
in Alternative Investments?
2) Frequency beware: how often are you relying
on data frequency as a proxy for your probability
assessments?
3) Some standard risk measures, uses and
misuses.
That will extend the review to some other
common pitfalls in performance measurement.
References
Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R. H. (1998)
Illusory diversification and retirement
savings. Working paper, University of
Chicago & UCLA.
Getmansky, M., Lo, A. & Makarov, I.
(2003) An Econometric Model of Serial
Correlation and Illiquidity In Hedge Fund
Returns. MIT LFE Working paper No. 2001-1023.
Goetzmann, W. (2004) Hedge Funds and
the Frontiers of Finance. Presentation
at the 4th Hedge Fund Conference, Milan,
20 May 2004.
Kat, H. M. (2001) The Statistical Properties
of Hedge Fund Index Returns and Their Implications
for Investors. Working paper, Cass University
Business School.
Kat, H. M. (2002) Taking the Sting Out
of Hedge Funds. Alternative Investment
Research Centre, Cass University Business
School.
Lo, A. W., Petrov, C. & Wierzbicki,
M. (forthcoming) Its 11 pm
Do you know where your liquidity is?
The Mean-Variance Liquidity Frontier. Journal
of Investment Management.
This article was first published in
the Swiss Derivatives Review. For a free
subscription .please
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